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ADMINISTRATIVE ABNEGATION IN THE FACE OF
CONGRESSIONAL COERCION: THE INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS COMPANY AFFAIR
On June 16, 1947 the Supreme Court of the United States
unanimously decided that the Federal Power Commission
possessed the power to regulate wholesale sales of natural
gas made in the field to pipeline companies which transport
the gas into other states for resale for ultimate public con-
sumption when, at the time the sales were made, nothing
further in the gathering process remained to be done.1 Thus
was rendered the final judicial disposition of a case which
had become a major cause celebre among the members of the
natural gas industry. However, the decision in this, the
Interstate case, did not produce quiescence; the cries of
anger and alarm and the accusations which the outraged
natural gas industry leveled at the Federal Power Commis-
sion grew, rather than diminished, in volume and intensity.
This study of a problem for which the Interstate case served
as an apex, will demonstrate that these frenetic protests very
likely did not fail to achieve their objective, i. e., a diminu-
tion of effective federal regulatory authority over natural
gas companies which either sell or transport natural gas in
interstate commerce.
The fundamental legal problem involved in the Interstate
case, and in other similar cases which have preceded it, is the
interpretation of Section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act.2 Be-
cause of its controlling importance this section has been in-
serted in the main text.
The provisions of this act shall apply to the transportation
of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public con-
sumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other
1 Interstate Natural Gas Company, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, 330
U. S. . . ., 67 Sup. Ct. 1477, 91 L. ed. 1555 (1947)
2 52 Stat. 833 (1938), 15 U. S. C. 717-717w (1940).
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use, and to natural gas companies engaged in such transpor-
tation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation
or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural
gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the pro-
duction or gathering of natural gas.
It can be seen that Section 1 (b) bestows an affirmative
grant of jurisdiction over both transportation of gas in inter-
state commerce and wholesale sales of gas in interstate com-
merce. At the same time the section exempts, among other
things, production and gathering I from the jurisdiction of
the Commission. The problem illustrated by the Interstate
case is that of making determination of whether Congress has
given the Federal Power Commission the authority to regu-
late wholesale sales of natural gas made at the termini of
the field gathering lines to pipeline companies transporting
the gas in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has
given an emphatic approval of the exercise of such power;
industry has uttered a thunderous denial of its validity; the
Commission has offered conciliation; and a determined at-
tempt has been made in Congress to resolve the issue in such
a way as to assuage the indignant members of the natural
gas industry.4  Under such circumstances this strange dis-
play of a somewhat belated administrative self-effacement
warrants investigation.
The first case before the Court which clearly raised the
question was the Columbian Fuel Corporation case, decided
in 1940.' In that case the Commission decided that it did
3 While there is no absolute agreement on where the gathering process be-
gins or ends, it can be described fairly as the collecting of the gas from the in-
dividual wells by moving it through low pressure field lines to central points, such
as to the main compressor stations at the beginning of the trunk transportation
lines, or to processing and dehydration plants. See Stephens, Natural Gas Engi-
neering (1941), Vol. III, p. 141.
4 H.R. 2185 (The "Rizley" Bill) was passed by the House of Representatives
on July 11, 1947. The Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, by a vote of 6
to 5, refused to report out S.734, a companion bill.
5 In the Matter of Columbian Fuel Corporation, 2 F. P. C. 200, 35 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 3 (1940). The case aroused wide interest throughout the natural gas in-
dustry. Briefs were filed by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky, the
State of West Virginia, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia, the Na-
tional Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, the Mid-Continent Oil
and Gas Association, and the Independent Petroleum Association of America.
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not possess jurisdiction under Section 1(b) of the Natural
Gas Act to regulate rates charged for sales of natural gas in
interstate commerce for resale by a company engaged solely
in the production and gathering of natural gas where the
sales are made as an incident to and immediately upon com-
pletion of the company's production and gathering of the
natural gas, and where the company was not otherwise sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The Commission's essential finding of fact was that the
Columbian Fuel Corporation produced natural gas and sold
it at the termini of its gathering lines within Kentucky to a
pipeline company which transported it in interstate com-
merce. After examining the language of the Natural Gas
Act, the Congressional Committee reports, and the expres-
sions of opinion by individual Congressmen in the course of
debate on the bill, the Commission reached the conclusion
that this producing company, not otherwise a natural gas
company subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, was ex-
empt from its jurisdiction. The Commission took this more
restricted view of its authority because it believed that Con-
gress, in passing the Act, was of the mind that:
The companies to be subject to regulation were conceived
of as "pipe line" companies, and it was assumed that produc-
tion and gathering would enter the field of regulation only to
the extent that the "pipe line" companies, either directly or
through affiliates, controlled the production or the gathering
of the gas so transported.6
However, the Commission uttered this admonition:
Further experience with the administration of the Natural
Gas Act may reveal that the initial sales of large quantities of
natural gas which eventually flows in interstate commerce are
by producing or gathering companies which, through affilia-
tion, field agreement, or dominant position in the field, are
able to maintain an unreasonable price despite the appear-
ance of competition. Under such circumstances the Commis-
sion will decide whether it can assume jurisdiction over arbi-
trary field prices or should report the facts to Congress with
6 2 F. P. C. 200, 207.
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recommendations for such broadening of the Act and provision
of additional machinery as may appear necessary to close this
gap in effective regulation of the natural gas industry3
The majority, though evidently conscious that such a re-
stricted view of the scope of the federal power might well re-
sult in weakening effective regulation in the interests of the
consumers,8 and indicating by the language quoted here, that
time and circumstances might induce a change in their atti-
tude, preferred to exempt independent producers who, never-
theless, sell gas wholesale in interstate commerce. In reach-
ing this result they ignored the arguments of their own Com-
mission staff counsel who contended that these sales of gas
to be transported in interstate commerce are "sales in inter-
state commerce" beyond the power of the individual states
to regulate,9 and thus not excluded from Commission juris-
diction under the production and gathering exemption of
Section 1 (b) since "sale" is distinct from "production" and
"gathering" and, therefore, the negative language of the ex-
emption does not limit the affirmative grant of jurisdiction.' °
Commissioner Scott, who dissented, accepted the argu-
ments of staff counsel. In his opinion he distinguished sharp-
ly between a sale for resale, and the physical activity of
production and gathering. The exemption of production
and gathering contained in Section 1(b), he contended, was
not a limitation upon the affirmative grant of jurisdiction
over sales of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale.
He viewed the majority's exemption of sales in interstate
commerce made by an independent producer as suggesting,
7 Id. at 208.
8 "Clearly, if the language above quoted (Section 1(b)) is interpreted as
excluding from Commission jurisdiction, and hence from Federal regulation, all
companies whose sales of natural gas are made at the well mouth or at the end
of the gathering lines, there will be important initial sales of natural gas in inter-
state commerce which will remain outside the field of regulation altogether. Such
unregulated sales would, then, represent important elements in the costs which
must be taken into account in the regulation of all subsequent sales subject to
Federal or state jurisdiction." (Italics supplied) Id. at p. 204.
9 Brief of Commission Counsel, pp. 17-21.
10 Id., pp. 22-27.
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that the achievement of the basic purpose of the legislation,
viz., to fill the gap 11 wherein States may not act, is to be
urged toward the millenium. Neither the Act nor its legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended that the forego-
ing construction be ascribed to the statute. The sale of natural
gas in the instant proceeding is clearly interstate in charact-
er.
1 2
Commissioner Scott believed that, in drawing a distinction
between the independent and affiliated producers who sell
gas in interstate commerce, the majority erred, and that dis-
claiming jurisdiction in the former case, was tantamount to
holding that the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce
is a part of production and gathering of such gas.18 Answer-
ing the objection that it would be burdensome to apply the
provisions of the Act to the many small producers making
sales in interstate commerce, he pointed out that the Com-
mission has the power under the Act to make reasonable
classifications which are found appropriate to carry out its
provisions. Using this power, the Commission, he replied,
could exempt the small producing companies, having an an-
nual gas operating revenue of less than $25,000, from the
more arduous burdens of the Act.'"
In a case following close upon the Columbian Fuel deci-
sion the Commission held that where a producer or gatherer
of natural gas is also engaged in "the subsequent transporta-
tion and sale thereof in interstate commerce, it does not fall
within the same category" as the producer who only sells,
11 The Natural Gas Act of 1938 was passed to fill a hiatus in regulation
of the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. This hiatus
exifted because numerous Supreme Court decisions had held that, in the absence
of federal regulation, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution operated, of its
own force, to preclude the exercise by the States of regulatory authority over sales
of commodities flowing in interstate commerce. This prohibition was operative
whether the sale was made (a) in the state of origin, Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co.,
268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. ed. 909 (1925), (b) in the state of destina-
tion, Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. ed. 1027
(1924), or (c) at the state line, Public Utility Commission of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro S. & B. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. ed. 549 (1927).
12 2 F. P. C. 200, 211.
13 2 F. P. C. 200, 212. It might be noted that Commissioner Scott was the
only lawyer member among the Commissioners participating in the decision.
14 Id. at p. 216.
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but does not transport the gas, as was the situation in the
Columbian Fuel case. In this Billings Co. case, the produc-
ing company transported gas from the termini of its gather-
ing lines in Wyoming to the Wyoming-Montana state line
where it was sold and delivered to another transporting com-
pany which resold it in Montana for ultimate public con-
sumption."5
The next case posing the problem which the Commission
had apparently resolved in the Columbia Fuel decision was
the occasion for a noticeable change of position on the part
of the Commission. In Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Commission,' the essential facts were these: the Com-
mission claimed that Peoples was a natural gas company be-
cause it sold gas at its compressor station located at the
termini of it gathering lines in Pennsylvania to an affiliated
pipe line company which transported it into New York for
ultimate public consumption. After hearing, the Commis-
sion made a determination that the sale of natural gas by
Peoples to New York State Natural Gas Company "is a con-
tinuous process and appears to be a sale in interstate com-
merce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consump-
tion," "7 and ordered Peoples to produce its books and records
for the purpose of investigating the rates charged in such
sales. Upon the refusal of the Company to produce this in-
formation, on the ground that the Commission was without
jurisdiction, the Commission sought the aid of the courts.
After the District Court ordered Peoples to produce the
books and records requested by the Federal Power Commis-
sion the Company appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.
15 In the Matter of Billings Gas Co. et al., 2 F. P. C. 288, 35 P. U. R. (N. S.)
321 [1940).
16 Peoples Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F. (2d)
153 (App. D. C., 1942).
17 2 F. P. C. 1017, 1018.
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Peoples, in its argument before the District Court, had
relied on the Columbian Fuel case,"8 claiming to be exempt
as a producing and gathering company. Unsuccessful be-
low, the Company repeated this argument in its brief before
the Circuit Court;19 and, furthermore, pressed vigorously
the proposition that Congress, in closing the gap which pre-
viously had existed in effective regulatory authority, intend-
ed only to provide the Federal Power Commission with
jurisdiction over interstate pipeline companies whose main
function was the transportation and sale of gas at the city
gate for resale for ultimate public consumption.2" On the
other hand the staff counsel of the Commission preferred to
ignore the Columbian Fuel case and was content to rest with
the contention that the sales made by Peoples were sales in
interstate commerce under the principle of the Attleboro 21
and similar cases.22 The staff counsel argued also that the
allegation of "affiliation" said to exist between Peoples and
the purchasing company was a sufficient basis on which to
predicate the jurisdiction of the Commission.23
When the Circuit Court came to decide the case it rested
its decision purely on the grounds that the disputed sales
are in interstate commerce and subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction.24 It hurdled any obstacle which the Columbian
Fuel case may have been thought to present by simply push-
ing it aside with an innuendo as to its incorrectness, saying:
"We cannot disregard the plain language of the statute be-
cause the Commission at one time interpreted, it narrow-
ly ... ,, 25
18 Transcript of the Record in. the Supreme Court, Peoples Natural Gas Co.
v F. P. C., Oct. Term (1941), No. 1234, p. A17.
19 Brief of Appellant before the Circuit Court, at p. 8 and p. 26.
20 Id. at p. 27.
21 Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. ed. 909
(1925); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. ed.
1027 (1924); Public Utility Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro S. & E. Co.,
273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. ed. 549 (1927).
22 Brief of Appellee before the Circuit Court, at p. 12.
23 Ibid.
24 Peoples Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F (2d)
153, 155, (App. D. C., 1942).
25 Ibid.
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On petition for rehearing, after Peoples had urged more
emphatically the argument that the disputed sales were not
sales in interstate commerce but were sales "incident to the
production and gathering of natural gas," 28 the Court held
to its initial opinion. However, the Court embellished the
original holding by making clear the idea that the wholesale
sales in interstate commerce which Congress meant to regu-
late through the Natural Gas Act included sales of gas which
is about to move interstate as well as sales of gas which has
moved interstate. The Court quoted the decision rendered
in the Illinois Natural Gas case,27 saying:
... the particular point at which title and custody of the
gas passes to the purchaser without arresting its movement
to the intended destination does not affect the essential inter-
state nature of the business.
The Court felt that by using the phrase "in interstate com-
merce" in the Natural Gas Act, Congress had not narrowed
its view of what is "in" interstate commerce. The Court
was of the opinion that at the time the Act was passed, the
States lacked the authority to regulate the sales in issue.28
From this adverse decision of the Circuit Court, Peoples
unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,2"
arguing again in their brief that the sales involved were sales
incidental to production and gathering, made at the termini
of the gathering lines, and exempt under the principle of the
Columbian Fuel case."'
26 Appellants Petition for Rehearing, p. 37 et seq. In a lengthy footnote (pp.
36-37) petitioner argues that the Columbian Fuel case represented the correct in-
terpretation of the Act.
27 Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Commission,
314 U. S. 498, 62 Sup. Ct. 384, 86 L. ed. 371 (1941).
28 Peoples Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F (2d)
153, 158, (App. D. C., 1942). The Court paid no attention to Peoples' contention
that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission regulated the disputed sales.
29 Peoples Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, cert. denied,
316 U. S. 700 (1942).
50 Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 15. Attention was
drawn to the fact that Peoples' situation was even a stranger case for the
non-exercise of federal jurisdiction than that presented by the Columbian Fuel
case, since the gas purchased by the New York State Natural Gas Co. is often
stored by it in Pennsylvania, thereby substantially interrupting its movement to
New York.
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Meanwhile, what did the Commission think about this
somewhat unexpected judicial disapprobation of the conser-
vatism which they had exhibited by restraining their juris-
dictional libido in the Columbian Fuel case, and the green
light which the Court had flashed in favor of the exercise of
the federal power over sales made at the termini of gathering
lines for interstate transportation? Imbued, perhaps, with
a new confidence, born of the Circuit Court's attitude in the
case, staff counsel of the Commission soft-pedaled the ele-
ments of affiliation found in the case. In their brief before
the Supreme Court they now rested their case on the firm
basis provided them by the Circuit Court; the disputed sales
were sales in interstate commerce, beyond the power of the
State to regulate, and subject to the regulatory jurisdiction
of the Commission as provided by Congress. 1 Staff counsel
was content to merely distinguish the Columbian Fuel case
on hyper-technical grounds; and, if that were not sufficient
to erase this haunting memory of bureaucratic self-denial
the privilege of changing one's mind was relied on. 2 It was
now "immaterial that the sale is made by the producer at the
place of production." 11
The Peoples decision, then, for all apparent purposes over-
ruled, or at least substantially undermined, the Columbian
Fuel case. Because of the fact that the Peoples case was
tried on the pleadings of the parties, and the facts not de-
veloped, one writer infers that the case could be justified on
the grounds that Peoples may have engaged in interstate
transportation of gas before delivery. This is an inference
31 Brief for Respondent in Opposition, p. 12.
82 "The decision of the Commission In the Matter of Columbian Fuel Cor-
poration, 35 P. U. R. (N. S.) 3, relied on by petitioners, turns in part on the
narrow circumstance that the pipe lines of the producer's vendee were all located
in the state of origin and the vendee resold the gas in the same state for trans-
portation. Moreover, the Commission reserved the right to reconsider its conclu-
sion in the future, particularly where, as here, affiliation between vendor and
vendee exists." Id. at p. 13.
83 Id. at p. 12.
84 Newcomb, Effects of Federal Regulation Under The Natural Gas Act
Upon The Production and Conservation of Natural Gas, (1945) 14 GEORGE WASH-
3xGO'ON L. Rxv. 217, 225.
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without substance since the Circuit Court decided the case
purely on the premise that sales of gas about to move in
interstate commerce fall within the area of the permissible
exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction, 5 The Peoples de-
cision, indeed, was prologue to the case which was to prove
a bete noire to the Federal Power Commission.
The Interstate episode began prosaically enough. Inter-
state Natural Gas Company produced natural gas and pur-
chased gas produced by others in the Monroe gas field in
Louisiana." This gas is commingled, delivered, and sold to
three pipeline companies " at the inlet side of compressor
stations located in the Monroe field. The pipeline compan-
ies transported the gas into other states for resale for ulti-
mate public consumption. Interstate also possesses its own
interstate pipeline through which it transports gas in inter-
state commerce southward from the Monroe field' into
Mississippi and back into Louisiana where it was resold for
ultimate public consumption. A complaint was filed with
the Federal Power Commission by the Louisiana Public
Service Commission alleging that the rates charged by Inter-
state for the gas sold in interstate commerce for resale for
ultimate public consumption were unjust and unreasonable
and requesting an investigation and the fixing of fair and
reasonable rates.8 Interstate filed an answer to this com-
plaint denying the jurisdiction of the Commission; the ans-
wer alleged, inter alia, that there was pending undecided be-
fore the United States Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana a suit filed by Interstate to enjoin the Louisiana
Public Service Commission from enforcing an order subject-
35 Peoples Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F. (2d)
153, 159, (App. D. C., 1942).
36 Interstate produced and purchased a total of 51,659,799 Mcf of gas in
the Monroe field during 1941. Of this total, it produced from its own wells 28,-
819,814 Mcf. Interstate sold 21,863,278 Mcf to the three purchasing companies
in the transactions in question.
87 Mississippi River Fuel Corporation, United Gas Pipe Line Company (pur-
chased gas for the account of Memphis Natural Gas Co.), and Southern Natural
Gas Co.
38 In the Matter of Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc., 3 F. P. C. 416 (1943).
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ing Interstate's rates to its jurisdiction, wherein petitioner
alleged that they were rates for sales in interstate commerce
not subject to state regulation.80 Interstate's argument
convinced the District Court and on the basis of the above
allegation the District Court held that since almost all of
Interstate's business was in interstate commerce Louisiana
could not regulate it.4"
In the proceedings before the Federal Power Commission,
staff counsel relied on the distinction between production
and sale in interstate commerce, a distinction which Com-
missioner Scott had painstakingly labored in his dissenting
opinion in the Columbian Fuel case. These were sales in in-
terstate commerce and controlled by the principle of the
Peoples decision, argued staff counsel.41 The Columbian
Fuel case received "silent treatment" at the hands of staff
counsel save for a few reluctant remarks about it during oral
argument before the Commission. Interstate, of course, did
not omit mention of the Columbian Fuel decision. It argued
that the disputed sales were incidental to the gathering pro-
cess and that, under the Columbian Fuel decision, sales in
interstate commerce were exempt from the Natural Gas Act
when made in the production and gathering of gas.42
When the Commission came to decide the case it broke
completely with the unhappy memory of the Columbian
Fuel result and boldly acknowledged that the disputed sales
were wholesale sales in interstate commerce which Congress
intended should be regulated by them. In answer to the
contention that they fell within the production and gathering
exemption they had a ready answer:
89 In its petition before the District Court in Louisiana, Interstate averred
"that 99 2/3% of the gas sold" by it "is sold in interstate commerce"; and "that
said sales of gas so made by your petitioner are transactions in interstate com-
merce."
40 Interstate Natural Gas Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
33 F. Supp. 980 (E. D. La. 1940); 34 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. La., 1940).
41 Brief of Commission Counsel, p. 34 et seq.
42 Reply brief of Respondent, p. 19.
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When the distinction between production and gatkering of
natural gas, and the sale of such gas in interstate commerce is
kept in mind, effect is given to the Congressional objective.
The Commission is bound to obey the command of Congress
to regulate these sales in interstate commerce for resale to the
three pipe line companies. Such is clearly the implication of
the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Peoples Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F (2d) 153, cert.
den. 316 U. S. 700.43 (italics supplied).
Reenforced by the clear cut decision in the Peoples case,
the Commission had crossed the Rubicon; the Columbian
Fuel case was presumably buried by inference, no mention of
it being found in the opinion of the Commission. The Com-
mission did find evidence of some affiliation between Inter-
state and two of the three pipeline companies;44 and did in-
sert a rather doubtful finding that Interstate was engaged in
the transporting of the gas to the points of sale to the three
pipeline companies."' However, their decision was unmis-
takably predicated on the premise that the disputed sales
were sales in interstate commerce and not exempted as pro-
duction and gathering.
Taking its appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court, Interstate
claimed that Congress expressly intended to exclude from
the jurisdiction of the Commission, all sales "made in the
43 In the Matter of Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc., 3 F. P. C. 416, 421
(1943).
44 However, the Commission found: "that Mississippi River Fuel Corpora-
tion is an affiliate of Interstate; large blocks of voting stock of both companies
are owned by the Standard Oil Company (N. J.) and the president of Mississippi
is also president of Interstate. The evidence also disclosed that Interstate and its
affiliates, Hope Producing Company and Southern Carbon Company, control a
substantial portion of the gas acreage and production from Monroe field. Union
Producing Company, an affiliate of United Gas Pipe Line Company, also controls
a large portion of the acreage and production from the Monroe field. The evi-
dence also shows close contractual and operating arrangements between Interstate
and United Gas Pipe Line Company that have extended over a period of many
years." In the Matter of Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc., 3 F. P. C. 416, 419,
(1943).
45 Id. at p. 433. The record was replete with evidence that the lines throughL
which the gas passed on its way to the points of delivery to the pipeline companies
at the compressor stations within the Monroe field were gathering lines and not
transmission lines. See Interstate's main brief before the Commission, pp. 129-
152. Cf. Newcomb, In the Matter of Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc., 3 F. P. C.
416, 228. (1943).
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field by a producer or gatherer of gas even though such gas
was then transported and sold in interstate commerce under
the regulatory jurisdiction of the Act." 46 It relied on the
Commission's decision in the Columbian Fuel case 11 and ex-
pressed awareness of the fact that the Commission was now
following the views which dissenting Commissioner Scott
had expressed in his Columbian Fuel opinion.48 The argu-
ments raised by staff counsel before the Circuit Court would
seem to vindicate the charge of Interstate that the Commis-
sion had changed its tack. Contending that the disputed
sales were sales in interstate commerce and not exempt as
production and gathering, counsel for the Commission went
to attenuated extremes to distinguish the Columbian Fuel
case.49 Finally, they confessed that the Peoples decision
overruled the Columbian Fuel case, if there were anything
contained in the earlier decision which conflicted with the
Peoples opinion."0
A majority of the Circuit Court construed the exemption
of Section 1 (b) strictly "' and, havinge found the sales to be
wholesale sales in interstate commerce, held that the produc-
tion and gathering exemption did not apply,52 citing the
Peoples case with approval. Since the disputed sales were
46 Brief of Petitioner before the Circuit Court, p. 14.
47 Id. at p. 26.
48 Id. at p. 28.
49 "The Columbian Fuel decision, therefore, is not persuasive in the present
case:
(1) Because Interstate is not 'engaged exclusively in the production and
gathering of natural gas' and because it is 'otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
of this Commission' in that it is otherwise an interstate natural gas pipeline com-
pany and a natural-gas company under the Natural Gas Act. R. 58, 59, 81, 82.
(2) Because there is evidence as found by the Commission of 'affiliation, field
agreement, or dominant position in the field.' R. 59, 63." Brief of the Commis-
sion before the Circuit Court, p. 34.
These are distinctions without a difference. The Act confers upon. the Commis-
sion power to regulate particular activities; it makes no distinction between pro-
ducers and gatherers who are also engaged in transportation and those who are
not; nor between producers and gatherers affiliated with a purchasing pipeline
company and those who are not.
50 Id. at p. 35.
51 Ibid.
52 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 156 F (2d) 949,
951 (CCA Sth, 1946).
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wholesale sales of gas they fall within the objectives Con-
gress had in view when they passed the Act, because:
The purpose of the Natural Gas Act, as shown in the Sen-
ate and House Committee reports, which are identical, was to
provide for the regulation of natural gas companies transport-
ing and selling natural gas in interstate commerce. Its pro-
ponents were not interested in the production of gas or the
individual sales of gas at the well. Nor were they interested
in the gathering of gas in the field. What they were inter-
ested in, as the report in terms states, what they were trying
to reach, was wholesale sales of gas. It would be difficult to
conceive language better adapted to achieve this purpose than
the language of the act in question here. It would be difficult
to find a case more clearly illustrating the mischief which the
act was supposed to remedy, more fittingly applying the rem-
edy.53
There was a strong dissenting opinion in the case, based
chiefly on the view that disputed sales were not sales in in-
terstate commerce since delivery was made within the State
of Louisiana. Regulation of the price which the gatherer
receives for the sale made at the termini of the gathering
lines to the pipeline company appeared, in the dissenting
judge's mind, as regulation of production and gathering
which Congress meant to exempt from the Act.
5 4
Interstate petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
alleging that the sales were not sales in interstate commerce
and thus exempted under the production and gathering pro-
hibition.5 Staff counsel rejoined that the sales were sales
in interstate commerce, and, under the principle of the
Peoples decision, not exempted as production and gathering.
No attempt was made to distinguish the Columbian Fuel
case, except to mention the fact that the decision of the Cir-
cuit Court in the Peoples case had been sustained on cer-
tiorari."' The Supreme Court at first denied certiorari 51
53 Id. at p. 952.
54 Id. at p. 953 et seq.
55 Brief in support of Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, p.
19 et seq.
56 See Brief of Federal Power Commission in Opposition to Writ of Cer-
tiorari.
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but reversed and granted it on petition for rehearing, limited
to the jurisdictional questions.58
At this point the grumbling which had been detected
among the members of the National Gas industry became
full-throated roars of virulence at what was interpreted to
be an unauthorized extension of the Commission's jurisdic-
tion into the realm of the regulation of production and gath-
ering. The fear was expressed that not only would the Com-
mission now be free to regulate the production and gather-
ing functions, but that it would be in a position to assert
jurisdiction over the oil business, since, save in the case of
"dry" gas, wells which produce natural gas, are productive
also of oil.59 The oil industry recoiled in horror at the pros-
pect (however imaginary) that the Federal Power Commis-
sion would attempt to apply the six and one-half per cent
rate of return standard to their business."0 Dire prophecies
were indulged in to the effect that the deterrent specter of
Commission jurisdiction would cause gas producers to refuse
to sell their gas for interstate marketing, thus interfering
with conservation measures, since it would result in the con-
57 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 329 U. S. 802,
67 Sup. Ct. 124, 91 L. ed. 375 (1946).
58 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 330 U. S.... ,
67 Sup. Ct. 1477, 91 L. ed. 1355 (1947). In its petition for certiorari Interstate
had also alleged that the rate order of the Commission was confiscatory. Certiorari
was denied on this question.
59 "The Federal Power Commission would seem now to have ample power
at its unfettered discretion to apply its net investment rate base methods to pro-
duction and gathering and fix the well-head price of any gas entering a pipeline
company or purchased from others and whether or not produced in association
with oil. The express exclusion of the business of producing and gathering from
the jurisdiction of the Commission, blandly ignored, has been completely nullified.
The Commission may also, presumably, subject oil companies and other independ-
ent suppliers of pipeline gas to the exacting requirements of its uniform system of
accounts." Crosby, Will The F. P. C. Drive Natural Gas Out of the Fuel Market
(1947) 39 Public Utilities Fortnightly 3, 4.
60 "I, and many others like me, are afraid that if we separate suct gas, strip
it of its liquid hydrocarbons, compress it, and deliver it to main transmission
lines, we are in danger of being regarded as performing an act in interstate com-
merce and subjecting our oil producing operations to the withering hand of fed-
eral control." Statement of Maston Nixon, Vice President of Southern Mineral
Corporation, F. P. C. Natural Gas Investigation, Docket No. G-580, Tr. 3461.
Needless to say, the Commission has never attempted to regulate any aspect of
the oil business.
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tinued flaring off of large volumes of casinghead (oil-well)
gas."' Attempts were also made to blame an existing natural
gas shortage on the fear of the natural gas producers to sell
to pipeline companies in view of the prospect that they would
fall subject to Commission regulation.6"
At this point the diuretic protests against the Commis-
sion's alleged encroachment upon the production and gath-
ering process roused Congress to action. Three bills to
amend the Natural Gas Act were introduced in the House of
Representatives and one in the Senate within a three-day
period.6" These bills were admittedly tailored to the desires
of the natural gas industry.64 In fact the strong inference
has been made that the connection between at least one of
the representatives who introduced a bill and the pipeline
interests was not remote.6" The amendments " were drawn
to (1) exclude the jurisdiction of the Commission over trans-
portation between the well and the point of delivery to the
61 Federal Power Commission Natural Gas Investigation, Docket No. G-580;
Staff Rep. on Section l(b) of the N. G. A. (March, 1947) at p. 37.
62 Ibid. See also Statement of W. Hawkins, Vice Pres., Magnolia Petroleum
Co., New York Journal of Commerce, April 10, 1947.
63 H.R. 2185, introduced on February 24, 1947 by Mr. Rizley of Oklahoma;
H.R. 2235, introduced on February 26, 1947 by Mr. Carson of Ohio; H.R. 2292,
introduced on February 27, 1947 by Mr. Davis of Tennessee; S. 734, introduced
on February 28, 1947 by Senator Moore of Oklahoma. These bills were almost
identical in content. H.R. 2569, introduced on March 17, 1947 by Mr. Dolliver
of Iowa was concerned with providing a policy for the administration of the Nat-
ural Gas Act; a policy which would protect the use of coal as a fuel competing
with natural gas.
64 "The measure (refers to H.R. 2185 and S. 734) is frankly an industry bill
and two of its sponsors, Moore and Rizley, are from the gas producing state of
Oklahoma . . . The measure has general industry support since it was drafted by
the Independent Natural Gas Association and attorneys for other groups and in-
dividual oil and gas companies." Ralph, Watching Washington, Oil and Gas
Journal, March 8, 1947, pp. 37 and 39.
65 "The bill is sponsored by Rep. Ross Rizley (D., Okla.) whose law firm is
listed in Martindale and Hubble Law Directory for 1947 as having clients of
which these are representative: Cities Service, Republic Natural Gas, and Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Line." Ruth Finney (Scripps-Howard staff writer) in the
Washington Daily News, July 11, 1947.
66 Exclusive of the Dolliver (or "coal interests") Bill, H.R. 2185, introduced
on February 24, 1947 by Mr. Rizley of Oklahoma, H.R. 2235, introduced on Feb-
ruary 26, 1947 by Mr. Carson of Ohio, H.R. 2292, introduced on February 27,
1947 by Mr. Davis of Tennessee, S. 734, introduced on February 28, 1947 by
Senator Moore of Oklahoma.
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interstate trunk transmission facilities, and over any sale
made at or prior to such point of delivery; (2) insure that
the Commission would allow as operating expense, the ac-
tual price paid for gas purchased, if purchased from non-
affiliates, or, if purchased from an affiliate, the current mar-
ket price in the field or the fair and reasonable value; (3)
provide that the Commission would allow reasonable com-
pensation for gathering and deliverying gas to transmission
facilities. (There was a proviso in the bills, however, that
a natural gas company owning production or gathering fa-
cilities could elect where it wished to waive the "current
market price" or the "reasonable compensation" standards
and have its production and gathering facilities included in
the rate base for charges subject to Commission jurisdic-
tion.) Furthermore, the bills amended Section 7(c) of the
Natural Gas Act by providing for the issuance of certificates
of public convenience and necessity without hearing under
certain conditions, and for the extension of facilities to serve
existing markets without the necessity of obtaining a cer-
tificate.
The fundamental objectives of the amendments plainly
were (1) to knock out the decision, and the portent of that
decision, made by the Circuit Court in the Interstate case,"
by restricting Commission jurisdiction to sales in interstate
commerce made after transportation had begun; and (2) to
divest the Commission of the power to include production
and gathering facilities in the rate base. 8 The Commis-
sion's authority to do the latter had been sustained by a five
to fdur decision of the Supreme Court in Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 581, 65
Sup. Ct. 829, 89 L. ed. 1206 (1945).19
67 Cong. Rec., 80th Cong., 1st Sess., March 10, 1947, p. 1950.
68 House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H. R. 2569 and H.R.
2956, (1947) pp. 26-37.
69 After reaching the conclusion that production and gathering facilities may
be included in the rate base of rates or charges subject to the Commission's juris-
diction the Court went on to say: "That does not mean that the part of Section
1(b) which provides that the Act shall not apply 'to the production or gathering
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
At this crucial stage the Commission released a staff
report dealing with the production and gathering question
under Section 1 (b). This report was one of the first to
come out as a result of the Commission's exhaustive Natural
Gas Investigation, which Congress had authorized, and
which had been in progress for nearly two years.70 This re-
port called attention to the "widespread atmosphere of anx-
iety and uncertainty among State officials and the industries
concerned" with regard to the meaning and implications of
Section 1(b) with reference to the exemption of production
and gathering. It concluded that the legislative history of
the Act compelled the conclusion that the exemption would:
clearly seem to exclude from regulation under the Act sales
made incident to or immediately upon the completion of pro-
duction and gathering, and before interstate transportation be-
gins. (italics supplied) 71
The report then reviews the Commission cases which have
been concerned with the problem in order "to ascertain
whether or not the Commission has adhered consistently to
any central principle in its findings and decisions on this
jurisdictional question." The conclusion is reached that the
Commission has been a model of consistency in this regard.
The Columbian Fuel case is brought back from the limbo of
overruled cases and reinstalled as the pivotal decision on the
question. 72  The Peoples case is passed off with the infer-
ence that the exercise of Commission jurisdiction could have
of natural gas' is given no meaning. Certainly that provision precludes the Com-
mission from any control over the activity of producing or gathering natural gas.
For example, it makes plain that the Commission has no control over the drilling
and spacing of wells and the like. It may put other limitations on the Commis-
sion." 324 U. S. 581, 602.
Other cases sustaining the inclusion of production and gathering facilities in
the rate base are: Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 155 F
(2d) 694 (CCA 10th, 1946) cert. den. 329 U. S. 773, 67 Sup. Ct. 191, 91 L. ed.
75 (1946); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324
U. S. 635, 65 Sup. Ct. 821, 89 L. ed. 1241 (1945); and Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333
(1944).
70 Federal Power Commission Natural Gas Investigation, Docket No. G-580;
Staff Rep. on Section 1(b) of the N.GA. (March, 1947) at p. 37.
71 Id. at p. 3. On this it was in complete harmony with the "Rizley" Bill.
72 Id. at p. 14.
THE NATURAL GAS AFFAIR
been justified on the grounds that there could have been a
finding of transportation.78 Furthermore, says the report,
that was a sale to an affiliated purchaser.74 As for the Inter-
state decision (in the Circuit Court) much is made of the
fact that Interstate is a natural gas company transporting
natural gas for resale in interstate commerce; that Interstate
had transported the gas to the points of the disputed sales;
and, furthermore, there was a Commission finding of corpo-
rate affiliation existing between certain of the companies in-
volved.75 All this leads the report to conclude:
Consideration of the facts presented under Section l(b)
of the Act, as reviewed above, reveals no single instance where
the Commission's affirmative decision as to jurisdiction de-
pended upon the assertion that the Act applies to those who
produce or gather gas and then, before transportation begins,
sell it at arm's length to natural gas companies engaged in its
transportation or subsequent sale for resale.78
The report then went on to urge that an administrative rule
be promulgated by the Commission which would make it
clear that "all activities, including sales made at arm's
length, by those who only produce, gather or process natural
gas prior to its transportation or sale by others in interstate
commerce" should be exempted from jurisdiction of the
Commission.77
The reaction to this staff study on the part of industry
and Congress should not have been unexpected. Industry
did not take kindly to the suggestion that the situation could
73 Id. at p. 16.
74 Id. at p. 18.
75 The attempt to distinguish the Interstate case does not stand up under
the facts. The finding of. transportation made by the Commission was based on
very controversial evidence and was merely a subsidiary prop, if that, upon which
they relied in making jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Commission, in deciding
the case before it, relied on the Peoples decision, which, of course, was rested en-
tirely upon the premise that sales in interstate commerce were involved. Nor
was the Commission's finding of affiliation relied on in their opinion as the basis
upon which they assumed jurisdiction.
76 Federal Power Commission Natural Gas Investigation Docket No. G-580;
Staff 'Rep. on Section 1(b) of the N.GA. (March, 194.7) at. p. 22.
77 Id. at p. 41.
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be clarified by the issuance of an administrative rule; 78 the
certainty of congressionally imposed standards could not be
approximated by the vagaries of bureaucratic edict, thunder-
ed Congressman Rizley." Other critics, even less kind, saw
the staff report of G-580 as a stalling tactic "to prevent pass-
age of the Rizley bill..." so
Undaunted, however, by the outcries of the hostile skep-
tics, the Commission proceeded to draft a rule exempting
arm's length sales of gas made by independent producers.
"Gathering" was defined to include sale and delivery prior
to the beginning of transportation in interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Act. Notice was given and inter-
ested parties asked to submit their views."'
Nor was the Commission content to rest with the pro-
posed rule alone. In rapid fashion it ground out three de-
cisions which should have set the apprehensions of the "in-
dependent" producers at rest. On May 21, 1947 the Com-
mission held that the representations of a Texas partnership
that it iltended to engage solely ii producing and gathering
of natural gas or the sales of such gas at arm's length to an
unaffiliated interstate pipeline company justified the Com-
78 "An administrative body should never be permitted to define the field
of its own jurisdiction. That is the function of Congress. Businesses affected by
the regulations of such a body will never feel secure in any position; because if
an administrative body can define its own jurisdiction, it can pick and choose and
discriminate as it may please." Statement of H. H. Baker, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, Humble Oil Co., House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R.
2569 and H.R. 2956, (1947) pp. 26-37, at p. 155. See also, Ralph, Watching Wash-
ington, Oil and Gas Journal, July 28, 1947, at p. 164.
79 "It occurs to me, however, that the FPC like numerous other agencies
and bureaus which have been for many years interpreting the laws enacted by the
Congress in such a way as to give them the broadest possible power without
restraint, merely wants to head off legislative action that would curb its power.
. . . There is only one proper answer to all of this confusion, and that is to let
the Congress write into law the standards and make sure the FPC carries out the
Congressional mandate." Mr. Rizley on the floor of the House, Cong. Rec., 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., March 10, 1947. p. 1950.
80 Ralph, Watching Washington, Oil and Gas Journal, March 15, 1947, at p.
68.
81 In the Matter of an Interpretative Statement of the Commission's Juris-
diction under Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act with Reference to Production
or Gathering, Docket No. R-106, May 27, 1947.
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mission's finding that the partnership was not a natural gas
company within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act.82 On
May 22, in the Fin-Ker Oil and Gas Production Co. case,"
the Commission held that an independent production com-
pany, which neither owns nor operates any interstate trans-
mission facilities, and has no corporate affiliations with nat-
ural gas pipe line companies, and whose only sales of natural
gas were made at the termini of its gathering lines to a pipe-
line company which subsequently transports and sells it in
interstate commerce, is not a natural gas company subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission pointed
out that their ruling was controlled by the Columbian Fuel
case, supra. The Interstate decision was distinguished on
the grounds that there the company had engaged in inter-
state transportation and sale, had successfully asserted in a
Federal Court that Louisiana had no jurisdiction over the
disputed sales, and that there was also present in that case
evidence of affiliation and control of a dominant field posi-
tion through the control of production acreage. Finally, in
a decision handed down on May 28, 1947, the Commission
disclaimed jurisdiction over a production company selling
gas at arm's length to a non-affiliated production company
even though, subsequent to the date of the contract between
the parties, and at the time rate proceedings were instituted
by the Commission, the production company owned 81% of
the pipeline company's voting stock and certain officers and
directors of the production company also served in a similar
capacity for the pipeline company! 84 The Commission, in-
deed, was going to great lengths to prove its sincerity in ab-
staining from annoying the "independent" producer.85
82 In the Matter of R. J. and D. E. Whelan, FPC Release No. 3347, Docket
No. G-899, May 21, 1947.
,83 In the Matter of The Fin-Ker Oil and Gas Production Co., Federal Power
Commission Opinion No. 149, May 22, 1947.
84 In the Matter of Tennessee Gas and Transmission Company and the Chi-
cago Corporation, Federal Power Commission Opinion, No. 150, May 28, 1947.
85 The Tennessee case suggests a rather obvious, but presumably effective
method by which to avoid Commission jurisdiction over wholesale sales made in
the field. Simply form two independent companies, one a production company,
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In spite of these endeavors at reform, neither industry
nor Congress was convinced. Self-serving motives were de-
tected in the above decisions, and when the chairman of the
Federal Power Commission mentioned them in his testimony
before the House given one day after the last of the trio had
been handed down,86 pointed attention was drawn by Mr.
Rizley to the fact that a period of two years, in one case,
and of five years in another, had elapsed between the time
applications were filed and the time of the Commission de-
cision.87
Up to this time the Supreme Court had not handed down
its decision in the Interstate case and thus the Commission
was still forced to explain that case at the same time they
were making such violent efforts, through proposed rules,
Commission decisions, and public statements, to convince
Congress and the industry that they did not mean to lay a
hand on the independent producer. The Commission relied
on the fact that Interstate was "otherwise a natural gas com-
pany" which transported and sold gas in interstate commerce
in addition to the sales it made in the field to the three other
pipeline companies.88 The chairman of the Commission was
forced to admit, however, that should the Supreme Court
sustain the Commission "in such sweeping terms as to really
imply that the statute means that we do have control over
the independent producer and gatherer," an amendment to
the Natural Gas Act would be in order.8" Thus, on the eve
of Supreme Court's action on the Interstate case, we are pre-
sented with the unusual spectacle of an administrative
agency frantically trying to vitiate the charges hurled at
the other a pipeline company; make a contract for the purchase of gas at pleas-
ingly high rates; and then merge. Furthermore, the record in the case discloses
that amendments of the original contract were made after the affiliation of the
two companies which resulted ultimately in increased costs being passed on to
consumers.
86 House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569 and H.R.
2956, (1947), at p. 671.
87 Id. at p. 714.
*88 Id. at p. 673.
89 Id. at p. 693.
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them by the natural-gas industry members and their repre-
sentatives in Congress by giving up part of their jurisdiction
over wholesale sales in interstate commerce, a jurisdiction
which was bestowed upon them by the clear language of the
Act itself, not to mention the further abundant evidence
found in the legislative history of the statute. So intent
were they to mollify their critics, that they had agreed in
advance that if the Supreme Court should sustain their po-
sition they would willingly surrender the fruits of that vic-
tory!
In its main brief before the Supreme Court the Commis-
sion concerned itself with an attempt to prove that its deci-
sions had been consistent right along; that the Columbian
Fuel case was distinguished from the case before the Supreme
Court; that the Peoples case was rested on the affiliation
found therein; and that, above all, the Commission had
never sought to extend its jurisdiction over sales of natural
gas made by independent producers and gatherers, but only
over sales made by one "otherwise a natural-gas company,"
or where affiliation between seller and purchaser is involved,
or where there is transportation in interstate commerce by
the seller After completion of gathering prior to the wholesale
sale." Forsaken now was any argument that the exemption
of production and gathering was inapplicable to cases of
wholesale sales in interstate commerce; after all, had not the
Commission found that Interstate had transported the gas
after gathering had been completed? Although the obvious
answers to these shaky distinctions are too obvious to re-
peat,91 it must be admitted the brief was safe enough for the
chairman of the Federal Power Commission to distribute it
90 Brief for the Federal Power Commission at p. 43.
91 In its Circuit Court brief the Commission relied almost exclusively on the
ground that the sales in issue were sales in interstate commerce; the Peoples case
was relied on to support the Interstate case without discussion of affiliation; the
phantasy that Interstate "was otherwise a natural-gas company" had not yet been
conjured up.
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among the members of the House Interstate Commerce Com-
mittee, when he testified before them.2
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States still
decides the law as it finds it and not as it is dressed up to suit
particular individual purposes, good or bad. In a unanimous
decision the Court found that the disputed sales were sales
in interstate commerce 11 and not exempt as production or
gathering since, at the time the sales were made, nothing
further in the gathering process remained to be done. 4 The
Court encountered no difficulty at all in arriving at the con-
clusion that the sales were made in interstate commerce, re-
marking:
We see no distinction between a sale at or before reaching
the state line. There is nothing in the terms of the Act or in
its legislative history to indicate that Congress intended that a
more restrictive meaning be attributed to the phrase "in inter-
state commerce" than that which theretofore had been given
to it in the opinions of this Court. 95
Answering the Company's objection that the transactions
fell within the production and gathering exemption of Sec-
tion I (b), the Court gave emphasis to what they believed to
be the congressional purpose in passing the Natural Gas Act,
namely, to occupy the field of jurisdiction within which state
regulatory authority was precluded because of previous Su-
preme Court decisions.96 It acknowledged that Congress
did not intend to usurp the powers of the states in those
areas where valid state action could operate, such as state
regulation of "the physical production and gathering of nat-
ural gas in the interests of conservation." " The Court,
92 House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569 and H.R.
2956, (1947) p. 673.
93 .... U. S ..... , 67 Sup. Ct. 1477, 91 L. ed. 1383 (1947).
94 Id. at p. 1488.
95 Id. at p. 1486. The Attleboro and Peoples cases are cited by the court
in support of the conclusion reached on this point.
96 Id. at p. 1487. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U . S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct.
481, 69 L. ed. 909 (1925); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup.
Ct. 544, 68 L. ed. 1027 (1924); Public Utility Commission of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro S. & E. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. ed. 549 (1927).
9T Ibid.
THE NATURAL GAS AFFAIR
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, admitted that
there might be sales which, "although technically consum-
mated in interstate commerce, are made during the course
of production and gathering and are so closely connected
with the local incidents of that process as to render rate
regulation by the Federal Power Commission inconsistent or
a substantial interference with the exercise by the State of
its regulatory functions," in which case Commission juris-
diction would not attach.98 After pointing out that there is
nothing in the record to indicate that federal regulation of
the questioned sales had conflicted in any way with the elab-
orate conservation program of Louisiana, the Court comes
to the nub of the controversy and finds that:
By the time the sales are consummated nothing further
in the gathering process remains to be done. We have held
that these sales are in interstate commerce. It cannot be
doubted that their regulation is predominantly a matter of na-
tional, as contrasted to local concern. All the gas sold in these
transactions is destined for consumption in States other than
Louisiana. Unreasonable charges exacted at this stage of the
interstate movement become perpetuated in large part in
fixed items of costs which must be covered by rates charged
subsequent purchasers of the gas including the ultimate con-
sumer. It was to avoid such situations that the Natural Gas
Act was passed.99
The opinion of the Supreme Court appears clear, concise,
and correct. Sales of commodities about to move in inter-
state commerce are as much "in interstate commerce" as
those made after movement has begun. The legislative his-
tory of the Natural Gas Act demonstrates beyond a shadow
of doubt that it was passed to close the gap where state
jurisdiction was prohibited and where federal regulation was
needed in order that wholesale costs could be kept down
98 Ibid. Presumably this category of sales local in nature would embrace
sales made at the well head by the individual well owners. It well, might include
sales made by small individual producers along the gathering Aines of producing
companies who both purchase and produce gas. For example, the gas purchased
by Interstate from other producers in the Monroe Field wotld fall within the
class referred to by the Court.
99 Id. at p. 1488.
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with a concomitant easing of the burden on the ultimate
consumer. 00 Nor do sales in interstate commerce, made aft-
er gathering has ceased, fall within the exemption contained
in Section 1 (b). Finally, the Court recognizes that if federal
regulation was impotent in such a case, the enhanced costs
ultimately would be gouged out of the consumer. No specious
attempts are made to rest the decision on the grounds of
affiliation, transportation, or the catchy, but meaningless,
"otherwise a natural-gas company" slogan. On the contrary,
the Supreme Court inferentially disapproves of such ratioci-
nations in a cool footnote.'
The Interstate case would seem to be a firm holding that
wholesale sales bf natural gas in interstate commerce, made
when gathering is completed, are subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Power Commission. This would return the
Peoples' case to favor and at the same time, would seem to
knock out the Columbian Fuel, Fin-Ker, and Tennessee
cases, supra, where the Commission had disclaimed jurisdic-
tion on the grounds that the wholesale sales in interstate
commerce were made by independent producers. A serious
question is thus raised as to whether an administrative body
could, by a case or by rule, as the Commission had attempted
to do, give up the jurisdiction which Congress had bestowed
upon it. In principle it would appear that an administrative
tribunal can legally no more refuse to carry out, or sur-
render, some of the jurisdiction it possesses than it can grasp
that which Congress has not allowed it. In fact, the difficul-
ty of rectifying its error in the former case seems much
greater since the absence of a complaining party in such a
100 Sen. Rep. 1162, 75th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 2 (1935); H. Rep. 709, 75th
Cong., Ist Sess., p. 2 (1935).
101 "The Federal Power Commission has not asserted jurisdiction over all
sales taking place in the natural gas fields even though in interstate commerce for
resale for ultimate public consumption. In the Matter of Columbian Fuel Corp.,
2 FPC 200; In the Matter of Billings Co., 2 FPC 228. We express no opinion as
to the validity of the jurisdictional tests employed by the Commission in these
cases.o1
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situation is more than likely.102 As a pure legal principle the
Commission can not draw a distinction between independent
and affiliated producers who sell gas at wholesale in inter-
state commerce. Whether such a distinction could be justi-
fied on the grounds of expediency of administration will be
discussed infra.
When the Supreme Court's decision in the Interstate case
was handed down, the wrath of the natural gas industry and
its congressional janissaries knew no bounds. 103 The fight
to pass legislation amending the Natural Gas Act continued
102 "Administrative Abnegation," as a separate study, has received sparse
treatment by courts and by writers. It might be that the administrative agency
which is engaged in disclaiming jurisdiction and not enlarging its authority is
indeed a avis rara.. This much can be said:
(1) Where a power is conferred upon an administrative body and its exer-
cise made mandatory, there is no discretion as to whether, in good faith, and in
accordance with the legislative will, the power may be exercised, although there
may be discretion as to the manner of its exercise. See Yick Co. v. Hopkins, 118
U. S. 3S6, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1886); Posey v. Board of Education,
199 N. C. 306, 154 S. E. 393 (1930); Walsh v. Waldron, 112 Conn. 579, 1S3 A.
298 (1931).
(2) Nor can an administrative agency "limit or repeal the terms of a statute
addressed to the same subject matter under the same Act" when the statute has
not granted any power to control or modify its provisions. United States v. Jones,
100 F (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). See also Matter of Consumers Power Com-
pany, Holding Co. Act Release No. 1854, Dec. 28, 1938 cited by Gelhorn, (1940)
Administrative Law at p. 581.
(3) Where the particular provisions of the statute involved are directory only,
it would seem that the power to make rules and regulations under it would
permit the exemption of certain classes and categories from the operation of those
provisions if necessary for the administrative efficiency required to enforce the par-
ticular statute. Blachley and Oatman (1940), Federal Regulatory Action and Con-
t,'ol, p. 57.
(4) The powers of an administrative body to dispense with the operation of
specified statutory provisions is nothing more than a delegation of rule-making
power. It must be exercised in the light of prescribed statutory standards. People
v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121 (1915). See Sutherland (1943) Statutory
Construction, Vol. II, Section 315.
(5) There are isolated examples of judicially approved non-enforcement of
certain provisions of a statute on the part of an administrative body; these omis-
sions are usually of a temporary or sporadic nature, carried out in good faith, as
contrasted to cases of premeditated and systematic abnegation of administrative
duties. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 2S2, 36 S. Ct. 583, 60 L. ed. 984
(191s).
10 "Three natural gas organizations declared last night that the Supreme
Court's approval of the right of the Federal Power Commission to regulate the
industry threatened to stifle it." Associated Press dispatch, New York Herald
Tribune, June 23, 1947. See also New York journal of Commerce, June 19 and
23, 1947.
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with renewed vigor.' In the face of this concerted attack
the Commission proposed its own bill which it offered as a
substitute for the Rizley Bill. The Commission's proposed
bill would have exempted independent producers and gath-
ers who engaged only in those activities and who sold gas
in interstate commerce at arm's length. In addition "gather-
ing" was defined to mean the "collecting of natural gas from
wells of the gatherer or other producers by its movement to
central points through pipelines and other facilities . . ." '
In essence, the proposed bill was identical with the rule the
Commission had previously proposed.'0 6 The strategy of the
Commission at this point seemed to be to offer a compromise
and then ask Congress to wait until the full results of the
Commission's Natural Gas Investigation were divulged in
the fall of 1947. It appeared for a while as though their
reasonable request was doomed to failure as the Rizley Bill
was passed by the House of Representatives 107 and another
bill, embodying the Commission's proposals, was defeated. 8
However, at this juncture fortune smiled upon the harassed
Commission. During these very trying days the Commis-
sion had been faced with two bills amending the Federal
Power Act.' 0' But on this front, the power lobby over-
extended themselves. A vigorous newspaper campaign on
the part of both liberal and the otherwise conservative press
104 H.R. 2185, introduced on February 24, 1947 by Mr. Rizley of Oklahoma;
H.R. 2235, introduced on February 26, 1947 by Mr. Carson of Ohio; H.R. 2292
introduced on February 27, 1947 by Mr. Davis of Tennessee; S. 734, introduced
on February 28, 1947 by Senator Moore of Oklahoma.
105 F. P. C. Release No. 3390 (G-1101), June 23, 1947.
106 In the Matter of an Interpretative Statement of the Commission's Jfws-
diction under Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act wvith Reference to Production
or Gathering, Docket No. R-106, May 27, 1947.
107 H.R. 2185 (The "Rizley" Bill) was passed by the House of Representa-
tives on July 11, 1947. The Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, by a vote
of 6 to 5, refused to report out S. 734, a companion bill.
108 H.R. 4099, introduced by Mr. Priest of Tennessee on July 7, 1947 and
defeated by voice vote in the House on July 11, 1947.
109 H.R. 2972 and H.R. 2973, introduced by Mr. Miller of Connecticut on
April 7, 1947. These bills, in brief, would have curtailed the Commission's juris-
diction over licensed projects and over wholesale sales of electric energy in inter-
state commerce.
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evidently saved the day.110 The power bills were not re-
ported out of committee; the natural gas interests were
caught in this backwash of an aroused public opinion;"'
the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee refused to re-
port the bill out; ° American consumers again could breathe
easier for the while. Their escape from the fate which the
natural gas interests had in store for them is remarkable
when it is considered that the "consumer interests" which
were allowed to be voiced at the hearing held by the Con-
gressional Committee consisted only in the courageous
and instructive voice of Miss Anne Alpern, representing the
United States Conference of Mayors, plus a few letters of
protest from interested community heads."'
An appraisal of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
light of the factual conditions found in the natural gas in-
dustry leads this writer to the conclusion that the Court not
110 "Our memories are short, but padding of accounts, outrageous 'writeups',
and inflation of expenditures to affiliated concerns were once common practices
in the utility business. Our memories are indeed short. We have almost forgotten
Sam Insull, Howard Hopson and others of their breed. The legislation sought by
the power companies and being gravely considered by the House Interstate Com-
merce Committee seems calculated to bring us a new crop of Insulls and Hop-
sons." L. Mellett, Washington Evening Star, July 1, 1947. See also T. Stokes,
Washington Daily News, July 1, 1947; Marquis Childs, Washington Calling, Wash-
ington Post, July 2, 1947.
111 "Early in the present session of Congress sponsors of restrictive amend-
ments to the Federal Power Act tried to make a deal with the natural gas industry
to remedy both complaints in a single bill. Backers of the Rizley bill refused,
but they have now been caught in the backwash of the power fight." Ralph,
Watching Washington, Oil and Gas Journal, July 26, 1947 at p. 164. See, for ex-
ample, Marquis Childs, Washington Post, July 18, 1947; New York Times, July
22, 1947; Marshall McNeill, Washington Daily News, July 22, 1947; Kansas City
Star, July 13, 1947; Kansas City Times, July 16, 1947; Ruth Finney, Washington
Daily News, July 25, 1947; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, New York Herald Trib-
une, July 25, 1947. These and other journalistic attacks revealed dramatically
the attempt of the power lobby to inflate present prices of electric power and
natural gas.
112 House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569 and H.R.
2956, (1947) p. 456 et seq. Miss Alpern pointed up the ineffectiveness oi state
and city utility commissions in the face of the heavy artillery which the individ-
ual utilities can bring to bear. She offered documentary evidence showing that
the total rate reductions brought about by the Federal Power Commission from
1938 to 1946 approximated 157 million dollars. She drew attention to the fact
that the Rizley bill would exempt initial sales of gas to the pipeline companies
and thus create a "never-never" land within which the pipelines would be immune
to both federal and state jurisdiction.
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only was in accord with correct legal theory, but-and per-
haps even more important-handed down a decision which
recognized the actualities of transporting and selling natural
gas in interstate commerce. The history of the natural gas
industry, as disclosed by the Federal Trade Commission's
voluminous survey of 1936 and later reports, reveals beyond
doubt that the large pipeline companies, through the holding
company device, have dominated and controlled gas produc-
tion acreage. It is a "take it or leave it" proposition with the
allegedly "independent producer." forced to seek buyers
faced as he is with no freely competitive market."' The
TNEC report gave more recent evidence that the efforts of
"independent" producers, without pipeline outlets of their
own, to obtain a market for the gas which they produced
were seriously interfered with by the large pipeline compan-
ies." 4 The legislative history of the Natural Gas Act, based
on the report of the Federal Trade Commission, the hearings,
debates, and committee reports, indicates that Congress was
well aware that this was the status of the natural gas indus-
try when it enacted the statute." 5  As Mr. Chantland, At-
torney in Charge, Federal Trade Commission, testified dur-
ing the hearings:
If the two prior stages in the producing and transporting
phases are adequately handled so as to bring the gas to the
gates at a reasonable price, reasonable local schedules are then
a matter for the local regulatory bodies.
113 "The absorption by purchase of these comparatively recent developments
of production, transmission and distribution systems that threatened competition
with those of Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation and Standard Oil Co. (New
Jersey) (Interstate Natural Gas Co. is a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. of N. J.)
interests lends support to the statements of independent gas operators of Ohio
that any attempts to develop competing production and distribution systems will
be met by the full financial power of the big companies to prevent their success."
Federal Trade Commission Final Report, Sen. Doc. 92, Part 84-A, (1936) at p.
79. See also Id. at pp. 25, 26, 27, 36, 38, 42, 51, 56, 63, 68, 73, 79, 80, 132, 134,
160, 198, 227, 257, 574, 581, 601, and 607.
114 Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentra-
tion of Economic Power, Sen. Comm. Print, Monograph No. 36, 1940 at p. 57.
See also Id. at pp. 7, 11, 14, 17, 22, 29, 33, 34, 69, 70, and 71.
115 Hearings on H.R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1936 at pp. 51, 52, 55,
56, 57. Hearings on H. R. 4008, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937; Cong. Rec., 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 81, Part 4, at pp. 6725, 9316.
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But until the first two have been successfully dealt with,
local regulatory bodies are seriously handicapped in their
efforts, even with the authority upheld in Smith v. Illinois 116
to ascertain facts. Ascertainment of facts is a far cry from
power to affect those facts.1 17
While it is true that Congress did not intend to take over
all phases of the regulation of the natural gas industry, it did
undeniably attempt to exercise the federal power over the
area in which state action had been foreclosed by prior de-
cisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the power of the
state to regulate in the light of the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. This was a large gap 118 and Congress meant
to plug it effectively. Sales in interstate commerce are just
as much that if made at the beginning of transportation as
when made during, or at the end of, transportation. But as
a matter of practical regulation in the national interests,
even if, under the more tolerant attitude which the Supreme
Court has lately displayed toward state regulation of local
aspects of interstate commerce,1119 we allowed the states to
116 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133. 51 Sup. Ct. 65, 75 L.
ed. 255 (1930) upheld the right of a State Commission to inquire into the reason-
ableness of cost items such as that incurred by a purchasing pipeline company in
acquiring gas from an interstate transportation company when buyer and seller
are affiliated corporations and there is evidence that the sales were not made
at arm's length.
117 Hearings on H.R. 11662, Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S.
133, 51 Sup. Ct. 57, 75 L. ed. 255 (1930).
118 Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. ed.
909 (1925); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 5441 68 L.
ed. 1027 (1924); Public Utility Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro S. & E.
Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed. 549 (1927).
'IQ Townsend v. Yoemans, 301 U.S. 551, 57 S. Ct. 842, 81 L. Ed. 1210 (1937),
permitted state regulation of warehousemen's services. But such regulation did
not have the effect of increasing the prices involved in interstate sales. Milk Con-
trol Boaold v. Eisenberg, 306 U. S. 346, 59 Sup. Ct. 528, 83 L. ed. 752 (1939), per-
mitted state minimum price setting over sales of milk where only a small fraction
of the milk was shipped in interstate commerce; and where the state regulation
was in aid of a national policy of curtailing over-production of agricultural com-
modities. California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930, 85 L. Ed. 1219
(1940), involved the constitutionality of a state licensing statute which did not
discriminate against interstate commerce. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341,
63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1942), which sustained proration marketing agree-
ments dealing with raisins under the California Act even though 95% of the
raisins went into interstate commerce. This case represents the high-water mark
of a judicial tolerance of expanding state jurisdiction over local categories of inter-
state commerce. However, as in the Eisenberg case, Milk ContJol Board v. Eisen-
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regulate initial sales made in the field to the interstate pipe-
line companies, experience shows that the tendency of state
action is to raise the initial price, the final reaction to which
is always felt by the ultimate consumer.12 °
However, the concern of the pipeline companies was not for
the welfare of the independent producers or the preservation
of the jurisdiction of the several states. In fact, a series of
amendments, sponsored by the National Association of Rail-
road and Utility Commissioners, which would have made
sure that sales exempted from federal jurisdiction under the
Rizley Bill would be subject to state regulation 121 were re-
jected by Congress. This caused the NARUC to condemn
the Rizley Bill and may very well have been the final factor
in causing its defeat in Congress. 2 No, the real objectives
of the pipeline companies were to free wholesale sales in the
field from effective federal regulation and to require the Fed-
eral Power Commission to allow them the "fair market
price" for gas thus purchased when computing the rate base
for sales over which the Commission still did retain jurisdic-
berg, the state statute was in furtherance of a national policy to raise farm prices
to parity levels. See Note (1942) 26 MNNEso'rA L. R. 654; Note (1942) 41
MICHIGAN L. R. 968, 971.
120 The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma has recently issued a blanket
order refusing to permit natural gas to be taken out of the producing formations
of the Guymon-Hugoton Field at a price less than 7 cents per thousand cubic
feet; Peerless Oil and Gas Co. v. Cities Service Gas Co,, Order No. 19515, issued
by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, December 9, 1946. This writer believes
the Commission's action to be a violation of the Commerce Clause and in direct
conflict with the decision in the Intep'state case. A similar minimum price fixing
bill, passed by the Kansas legislature, was vetoed by the Governor. See Wall
Street Journal, April 11, 1947.
121 NARUC Bulletin No. 59, March 25, 1947. See also the testimony of John
Benton, representing the NARUC, House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R.
2292, H.R. 2569 and H.R. 2956, (1947) p. 634 et seq. Mr. Benton called atten-
tion to the fact that the imposition of minimum field prices by the individual
states may well be beyond their power. He suggested, however, that Congress,
under the principle of the Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408,
66 Sup. Ct. 1142, 90 L. ed. 1342 (1946), could bestow upon the states the power to
regulate such interstate sales. His theory is not without validity although it is
open to the theoretical objection that it makes Congress, and not the Supreme
Court, the interpreter of the Commerce Clause. See Dowling, Interstate Com-
merce and State Power (1947), 47 CoLumBTAN LAw REV. 547.
122 F. P. C. Daily News Digest, July 16, 1947, at p. 3.
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tion."2 ' Since the "fair market price" is pretty much of a
fiction, being at worst what the pipeline companies say it is,
and at best a metaphysic of public utility regulation which
has been found almost impossible of ascertainment, it is not
difficult to imagine the mounting profits to the pipeline com-
panies and the concomitant bite into the pockets of con-
sumers. 2 Production and gathering remain the last area
into which the concept of federal public utility regulation
has not yet penetrated. If the pipeline companies can ex-
pand this enclave to include initial wholesale sales of gas
their cup would run over. Such an ambition on the part of




Out of the concordia discors which characterizes the Inter-
state case and its tempestuous background two conclusions
fairly can be drawn. First, the decision of the Supreme
Court was correct on the grounds of legal theory and in ac-
cordance with sound federal public utility regulation. The
"gap" in jurisdiction which the Natural Gas Act was meant
to fill included sales of gas to be transported in interstate
commerce. The states did not possess the power to regulate
the sales, according to previous decisions of the Supreme
Court. Secondly, any attempt to exempt "independent"
producers from the jurisdiction which the Federal Power
Commission has over wholesale sales in interstate commerce
128 It is this latter objective which lies closest to the hearts of the pipeline
interests. The writer hopes to deal more fully with this subject in a subsequent
article.
124 House Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569 and H.R.
2956, (1947) p. 464.
125 Operating revenues of natural gas companies reporting to the Federal
Power Commission should increase for the first quarter of 1947 of 22.2 percent
over the comparable 1946 period. Net income was up 19.1 percent. New York
Journal of Commerce, June 20, 1947. The main cause of any shortage that exists is
the lack of sufficient steel pipe for transportation purposes. See statement of R. A.
Phillips, Vice President, Central Electric and Gas Co., in the Lincoln (Nebr.)
Journal, April 13, 1947.
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would result in increased costs to the consumers of the na-
tion and perhaps, in the long run, retard the otherwise rapid-
ly increasing use of natural gas as an industrial and home
fuel. There are two aspects to this latter proposition. First,
the exemption applicable to "arm's length" roles by inde-
pendent producers would give rise to the often difficult prob-
lem of ascertaining, with the certainty of proof required,
when affiliation or field dominance is present in a particular
situation. The area of maneuverability thus presented to
the pipeline companies would be large indeed; large enough
to multiply the hazard that they successfully could divide up
their producing and transportation interests in such a way
as to render difficult, if not impotent, effective federal con-
trol over wholesale sales of natural gas.
Furthermore, the proposed exemption of "independent"
producers is not justified by the language or legislative his-
tory of the Natural Gas Act, nor by the actual conditions
found in the natural gas industry. Assuming, arguendo,
that independent producers of gas were in a position to force
the pipeline companies to bid up the price of gas, then, in the
language of Chief Justice Vinson, ".... unreasonable charges
exacted at this stage of the interstate movement become per-
petuated in large part in fixed items of costs which must be
covered by rates charged subsequent purchasers of the gas
including the ultimate consumer." 126 If, on the other hand,
as the report of the Federal Trade Commission has indicated,
the pipelines really dominate the scene, then all this solici-
tude for the "independent" producer borders on hypocrisy
and subterfuge. The real interests to be served are all too
apparent.
126 For instance, the sales made by Interstate to Southern Natural, with
which company the Commission was unable to find any affiliation, in 1938 amount-
ed to over five million Mcf a year. In the Tennessee Gas and Transmission Com-
pany case, the amounts of gas sold by Chicago Corporation, the producing com-
pany, reached a maximum of over 200,000 Mcf daily. Under the proposed exemp-
tion the Commission would be precluded from exercising effective jurisdiction. The
ultimate burden on the consumer would not be negligible.
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One sympathizes with the Federal Power Commission's
attempts to resolve the dilemma in which the Court has
placed them. Perhaps, by adopting the suggestion of former
Commissioner Scott and exempting low income producers
from certain requirements of the Act they could find the
equitable answer to the whole problem and at the same time
avoid the change that they have forfeited jurisdiction which
is rightfully theirs, an abnegation of administrative functions
which the writer has suggested is beyond the proper power
of the Commission. 7
As Congress returns to Washington, a temporary quiet-
ness now prevails in the formerly extremely vocal ranks of
the natural gas industry.18  One wonders if it is merely a
lull before another storm, a remarshaling of forces, prior to
another full scale attack, on the principle of sound public
utility regulation in the national public interest. Will the
renewed plaintive bleatings of the lambs, i. e., the "inde-
pendent" producers, prove merely to be the disguised growls
of the wolves, i. e., the pipeline companies, preparatory to
another succulent bite into the consumers of the nation?
Alfred Long Scanlan
127 While the writer has taken the position, supra note 120, that an admin-
istrative body may not disclaim jurisdiction, an administrative agency has the
power of making reasonable classifications in order to efficiently carry out the
statute which it administers. Furthermore, the principle of "de minimc non curat
kex" would seem to offer another rationale on which to. overlook the small well
owner and producer.
128 There is recent evidence that the industry may adopt a more conciliatory
attitude as a result of an offer by the Chairman of the F. P. C. to talk over the
problems of regulation and legislation. See Oil and Gas Journal, Oct. 25, 1947
at p. 63.
